Abstract:
With the withdrawal of the last British troops from New Zealand in February 1870 the Colony found itself for the first time totally upon its own resources to ensure its own security. In 1899 New Zealand sent troops to aid Britain in an Imperial war in South Africa. It was in the thirty years between these landmarks that the Colony first developed an armed force of its own not supported by Imperial military power, and first developed attitudes towards military considerations in the absence of an immediate armed threat.
In the first half of our period the major threat perceived, and therefore the main reason for maintaining a military force, was a possible renewal of the Māori Wars; a fear lent credibility by the hostile attitude of the Kingite Maoris in the early 1870's, and by the failure to suppress the last Hauhau war parties until 1872. The war scares of 1878 and 1885 and the continued peacefulness of the Maoris gradually led to a change in the perceived threat. Especially after 1885 it was recognised that any danger to the Colony was like likely to be internal disturbance than a hostile naval raid on harbours and shipping by some European power at war with Britain. Such considerations inevitably involved the Colony to a degree in Imperial defense, since hostile vessels were supposed to dealt with by the Royal Navy, and since it was British foreign and imperial policy which put New Zealand at risk. The second half of our period therefore sees in addition to an emphasis on harbour defenses a desire to gain Imperial naval guarantees for Australasia, pressure by New Zealand for Britain to forestall Great Power territorial acquisition in South West Pacific, and Colonial interest in the schemes of Imperial and Australian Federation. These indications that the Colony was moving into an Imperial defense framework culminate with the offer of troops for South Africa in 1899.
The New Zealand Forces broadly reflected these changes of emphasis in defense thinking. The fear of renewed internal troubles in the 1870's prompted an attempt to reorganize the Militia, a levy of adult makes, as a source of manpower, since it was feared the British withdrawal would be interpreted by Maori and Pakehas alike as a sign of Colonial military weakness. The Militia however suffered all the disadvantages of a compulsory levy and did not survive in active form after 1872. In order to suppress any renewal of hostilities the Armed Constabulary were deployed on and around confiscated Maori land, notably in Taranaki and Waikato, and encouragement given to the Volunteers. These steps and the careful policies of McLean for most of the 1870's were sufficient to prevent further serious trouble.
The Volunteers remained numerically the largest part of the Forces throughout the period 1870-1900, though they were often doubtful military value and fluctuated in total strength from year to year. Despite frequent recommendations it was not until the late 1890's that serious attempts were made to reorganise them from a large number of completely discrete corps into some form of larger military organization. Reorganisation in the 1880's turned the Armed Constabulary into a garrison artillery force, the Permanent Militia, and (on paper) the Volunteers into harbour-defense field forces, and this scheme persisted until after 1900 as the Colony's military posture. Successive administrations during these years were largely concerned with attempting to make the actuality match the theory.