Abstract:
This thesis is a discussion and continuation of a project started by John Etchemendy with his criticism of Tarski's account of logical consequence. To this end the two central concepts of the thesis are those of an interpretational and representational model-theoretic account of logical consequence, respectively.
The first chapter introduces Etchemendy's criticism of Tarski's account of logical consequence, a criticism which turns essentially on an interpretation of Tarski according to which his proposed account gives rise to a purely interpretational model-theoretic account of logical consequence. Consequently there must be a representational aspect to our model-theoretic definition of logical consequence.
The second chapter introduces Etchemendy's notion of logical consequence: that of being truth preserving in virtue of the semantics of the involved terms. While this notion is representational, we argue that Etchemendy's notion of a categorematic treatment of terms reintroduces an interpretational aspect back into the model theory. The chapter investigates the resulting notion, compares it to other notions in the literature, and presents certain results that can be proved, under certain conditions, about this notion in relation to the notion of being truth preserving in virtue of the semantics of all terms.
Chapter three of the thesis is concerned with the question of how a standard model, seen as a domain and an interpretation function, manages to capture the different notions of model-theoretic consequence. As we explain, this question is most pressing when we want our models to both represent and interpret, and we will present a theory which allows us to see the models as both representing non-actual possibilities as well as provide interpretations for the terms.
The fourth chapter applies the lessons of the preceeding chapters to argue that Kripke Semantics can be seen as capturing the notion of being truth preserving in all possibilities under all interpretations of the non-logical terminology in the case where our language is augmented with an operator, ⃞, to represent logical necessity. We will argue this point by contrasting it with, though not necessarily disagreeing with, claims made by various authors to the effect that Kripke Semantics is not the appropriate semantics when our language contains an operator for logical necessity.
