Abstract:
This study examines the most important themes of the policy advice that was provided to the Holyoake Administration by its officials during the Vietnam War. The central question of this study is: how can the substance of that official policy advice to the government be understood and explained?
It is argued that New Zealand officials strongly advised the government to get involved in the Vietnam War (after an initial period of reluctance). Officials considered that New Zealand should provide military assistance to Vietnam to encourage the United States forward in South East Asia. Underpinning the officials' stance was an orthodox foreign policy outlook that was remarkably similar to that held by politicians and officials in Washington, Canberra and London. New Zealand officials sought to encourage the United States forward in South East Asia because of their stark fears about China's intentions towards the region, and of Chinese-style communism that appeared to be gaining a foothold in South East Asia. In addition officials reacted to Indonesia's policy of 'confrontation' with Malaysia, and Jakarta's growing closeness with Peking. Officials also considered that an expression of New Zealand support for United States Vietnam policy could win quid pro quo support from the United States for the Commonwealth's position on Indonesia.
Despite officials' strong recommendations that New Zealand should get actively involved in Vietnam and provide military support, New Zealand's Vietnam policy proceeded cautiously. Contributions of military assistance were always small, and some contributions once offered were delayed or deferred. The distinctive character of this policy was primarily shaped by the Prime Minister, Keith Holyoake.
At the heart of Holyoake's approach to Vietnam policy was his balancing of international and domestic interests. Holyoake shared his officials' belief that it was in New Zealand's interests to encourage the United States forward in South East Asia to contain communist China, and Chinese-style communism. But Holyoake also wanted to control all aspects of government spending, including defence spending. Consequently, military assistance to Vietnam would only be provided from the resources spare from the government's already heavy defence commitments to Malaysia and Thailand. In addition, Holyoake refused to provide military assistance to Vietnam during periods of political instability in that country. Further, he also refused to involve New Zealand in the more controversial aspects of the war (such as the air war), or to introduce conscription.
Holyoake and his officials considered that it was prudent for New Zealand to provide military assistance to the United States in Vietnam. The greatest shared fear of New Zealand politicians and officials (and of their counterparts in Canberra and London) was that the United States could retreat again into isolationism.
