Abstract:
This thesis examines a worrying period of change within US civil-military relations and more specifically the weakening of civilian control from Vietnam to the 1991 Gulf War. The particular aspect of this relationship, which is relevant to my study, is that existing between the military officer corps and the political executive. Vietnam is a logical starling point for this paper as it was the misunderstood lessons from that conflict that paved the way for the formalisation of the 'normal' theory of civil-military relations. Samuel P. Huntington's 'normal' theory relies on the professionalisation of the officer corps and the rigid separation of strategy and policy in order to maintain civilian control over the state. This thesis reveals the flawed nature of this theory within the prevailing environment of limited warfare. The Vietnam War is often regarded as simply a failure in civilian leadership due to the perception that the Johnson Administration constrained and hindered an otherwise adequate military strategy. This thesis aims to dispute this hypothesis by promoting the need for civilian control over strategy especially within a context of limited war, such as was the case in Vietnam. Vietnam is portrayed as a failure of military strategy, not civilian micromanagement. It is argued that military strategy is primarily an extension of foreign policy, and so warrants firm civilian control.
A second case study investigates the institutionalisation of the 'normal' theory through the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine and the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and the negative effect that these had on the planning, prosecution and termination of the 1991 Gulf War.
