Abstract:
This thesis compares two American Secretaries of State, John Foster Dulles and Henry Kissinger, and their respective policies towards the state of Israel and the Middle East.
Dulles and Kissinger shared two goals - the promotion of the position and status of the United States in the Middle East, without compromising the relationship of the United States with Israel, and the achievement of an Arab:Israeli peace settlemet. The aim of this study is to measure the effectiveness of Dulles and Kissinger in the pursuit of these goals.
The first chapter provides a background to Dulles and Kissinger and their involvement with Israel before and after their tenure as Secretary of State. The second chapter examines the pro-Israel lobby and the State Department, as case studies, in order to illustrate how Dulles and Kissinger were not significantly influenced by state and non-state actors.
Chapter three provides a theoretical framework for examining the individual, before explaining how Dulles and Kissinger may be differentiated by determining their respective operational codes - a difference which largely accounts for their relative effectiveness. Chapter four summarisies, compares and contrasts Dulles's and Kissinger's respective era, philosophies and approaches towards Israel and the Middle East.
The study concludes that overall Kissinger was more effective than dulles in pursuing the stated goals, owing to his style, approach and operational code.
