An exegesis of Fichte's fundamental principles in Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre 1794

Abstract

This thesis provides an exegesis of the fundamental principles that Fichte employed for grounding the entire realm of experience. The first chapter comprises an historical background surveying the rationalist/empiricist debate prior to Kant, and the suggested synthesis offered by him. Some brief comments about the concept of self, as employed by philosophers of this period, are also included. The second chapter develops the conceptual framework of the Wissenschaftslehre, as elucidated in Über den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre where Fichte sets out stringent criteria for the a priori justification for a single and unambigious fundament to all experience. Idealism and dogmatism are the two competing philosophies that can arise from the two basic contenders for the role of ultimate ground: the self and the Ding-an-sich. Fichte's stance vis-à-vis these philosophies is developed in the third chapter. The major part of this thesis then deals with the fundamental principles themselves. Attention is given to the transcendental methodology, the manner in which the self is grounded in activity, the interrelationship between the principles and the progressive development of the dialectic. Chapter five discusses whether Fichte makes any headway on the issue of the self and whether the single and unambigious ground for all experience is attained.