Religion and Reality : Toward a Wittgensteinean Perspective on Some Problems of Christian Belief

Abstract

This thesis attempts to achieve a particular kind of philosophical perspective on the notion of reality, and so too on several religious beliefs somewhat prone to run into problems revolving around that notion I have set out to do two main things. First, to present a particular (at least partly my own) interpretation of the later Wittgenstein's overall philosophical outlook. Second, to apply the principles of that outlook to several philosophical problems of Christian belief. The thesis thus falls fairly naturally into two parts. Part I prepares the ground for the grammatical investigations (Wittgensteinean philosophy proper) of Part II by examining Wittgenstein's later philosophical perspective in its general aspects. Those special sorts of problems the treatment of which is attempted in Part II are anticipated in Part I in two main ways. First, stress is laid (in Chapter One mainly) on Wittgenstein's own quasi-religious motives for doing philosophy; knowledge of them sheds unexpected light on the nature and spirit of his philosophizing throughout all stages of his career. A second anticipation is the characterization (in Chapters Two and Three) of Wittgenstein's new way of thinking as representing a radical rejection of various concepts both of language and of reality, which are logically indispensible to what will be termed 'traditional' philosophy. When these are rejected and a whole new way is adopted of viewing the language-reality question, much of the old way of philosophizing is simply transcended: without being solved, yet without being evaded either, the old problems simply disappear. Chapter Four is mainly transitional. It focuses, still generally, on the possibility and advantages of bringing this new perspective to bear on the problems of religious philosophy, especially on those centering on notions of reality. Several such problems arise in connection with Christian belief, and some of these are selected for treatment in Part II. Accordingly Chapter Five deals with the problem of the (real) existence of God. Chapter Six looks at the issue of whether religious experience ever constitutes genuine discernment or revelation of reality. Chapter Seven enquires whether a Christian historical belief about the (real) past may be true regardless of the facts of (ordinary) history. Chapter Eight questions the assumption that for a Christian belief to be about the (real) future (e.g. about an afterlife) it must have the logical status of historical prediction. Chapter Nine investigates the belief, emphasized by evangelical Christians, that Jesus becomes (really) personally present to the believer. Chapter Ten addresses the question of the reality of that substantial change (Transubstantiation) alleged by some Christians to take place in the course of their celebration of the Eucharist. In general terms, the argument in all these chapters is that the temptation to conclude the unreality of the objects of such beliefs stems very often from the application of a model of reality inappropriate to the belief in question. From a Wittgensteinean perspective, reality is not a univocal concept: one has to lock and see what real means in each and every individual linguistic context of its employment. Removal of (at least some of) the barriers to such clear vision, signalled by the occurrence of a philosophical problem, is the philosophical treatment attempted in each of these final six chapters.