Abstract:
In the seventeenth century the word tyrant meant not only an oppressive ruler (a tyrant by practice), but also a usurper (a tyrant without title). In both cases a tyrant was someone who broke the traditionally-accepted limits to political power. In one case the limit was to the extent of power, in the other to the means of acquiring it. And because tyranny was thus seen as breaking traditional norms it can be said to be an anti-innovatory concept.
But during the 1640s political change became rapid. As a result the initially conservative theory of tyranny, which had been used to reinforce traditional political morality, became radicalised. However, the structure of tyranny theory itself determined the way this radicalisation occurred. Because usurpation was tyrannical anyone defending political change tended to deny that they were supporting usurpation, or indeed innovation of any kind. Thus Winstanley and Liburne argued that it was the king who was a usurper (or tyrant), and the replacement of his rule with another government would not be usurpation, but the restoration of a truly legitimate situation. So, as an example, Winstanley's backward-looking desire to avoid usurpation is an effect of the way in which tyranny theory shaped thought.
In the 1650s many thinkers turned their backs on the novel ideas of tyranny developed in the 1640s. They tried to argue that, although the Interregnum regimes were tyrannical (because usurpatory), they could nevertheless be obeyed. The effect of this was to destroy their own notions of tyranny because they were in practice implying that the concept had no practical significance. The 1650s therefore saw the collapse of the theory of tyranny: it could not survive when it was used by thinkers who legitimated what it delegitimated.
The overriding theme in this story is the difficulty in using a theory of tyranny while at the same time supporting political innovation. Some did it successfully; others failed.
