Abstract:
This is a thesis about the accountability of Crown entities. The author argues that inconsistencies in the public accountability structure and performance of Crown entities pose a constitutional risk.
The Crown entity classification was created in 1992 and applied to a specific group of statutory bodies and a handful of Crown trusts. Expectations were raised about the increased financial accountability of these bodies to the House of Representatives, with the Government giving assurances about constitutional safeguards.
The author describes the reform context that led to the creation of the Crown entity classification and then explains what Crown entities are, how entities become Crown entities and discusses the relationship between the Crown and Crown entities. The author finds that Crown entities are instruments of Executive Government and tests that finding against the criteria formulated by the Court of Appeal in a leading case. The test supports the finding, but also highlights the gaps in the accountability obligations of Crown entities.
The accountability arrangements of Crown entities are then examined and examples of problems and deficiencies are discussed. Having detailed the evidence of inconsistencies and the constitutional dangers, the author then considers the recent remedial steps proposed by the Government. The author finds the Government's proposals to be inadequate and sets out further measures to address the problems. The author also proposes that common standards of accountability be applied to all statutory bodies, based on the measures applied to Crown entities. The author concludes that if appropriate measures are taken, Crown entities can be made fully accountable and the constitutional risk can be abated, thus delivering on the promises of 1992.
