Nonexistent Objects: Meinong and Contemporary Philosophy

Abstract

The main aim of this thesis is to try to understand theories of nonexistent objects, in particular Meinong's theory, and to clarify some of the reasons why philosophers have had so much trouble understanding and accepting them, especially theories of impossible objects. This thesis int'ends to be both historical and critical, i.e. it aims to be of interest both to historians of philosophy and to "analytic" philosophers. At times their respective tasks and methods have stood opposed; I see no reason for this and try to move freely between them. Though I do not purport to give an exhaustive exposition of Meinong's theory, I have tried to be faithful and charitable to his main texts. This applies equally to my discussion of his historical precursors, his contemporaries (friends and foes alike) who influenced him and contemporary Meinongians and their opponents. I present and evaluate what I see as the main arguments of theorists on both sides of the impasse, past and present, trying to make explicit, where I can, the underlying assumptions and intuitions which divide them, and to show where the impasse between them is or may be terminological and where it is or may be substantive. Chapter One provides an over-view of the current impasse over nonexistents. Of central importance is the question of just what the claim that there are nonexistent objects might mean. In the course of discussing this, as well as some methodological concerns I have in approaching the impasse, I try to isolate the main issues which need to be explored in order to make the most sense of Meinongian theories, and to see where they conflict with more orthodox views. Chapter Two gives an initial sketch of Meinong's theory, focusing on his principles of independence and indifference, which highlight the seemingly radical nonbeing and mind-independence of his nonexistents. If we can take this at face-value and can interpret his flirtation with assigning some mode of being to them in a non-damaging way, this sharply distinguishes Meinong from his historical precursors. Chapter Three looks closely at Meinong's notion of an incomplete object, trying to see what it reveals about his conception of the nature of existent and nonexistent objects. The main aim is to try to establish a clear sense in which some concrete individuals fail to exist. In this and the final chapter, I pursue a picture of Meinong as heading towards an innocuous bundle of properties model for nonexistents, according to which one can disambiguate and clarify many of his seemingly bizarre doctrines and distinctions in such a way that they become obvious, if uninteresting, truths, and one can show where he and Russell were largely talking past each other. Chapter Four considers the two main arguments for nonexistents found in Meinong, viz. the arguments from negative existentials and from intentionality. Neither is found to be a convincing argument for beingless objects. Chapter Five examines some of the main arguments against, nonexistents Of chief concern and merit are those against the notion of an impossible object.