Abstract:
Phenomenology offers a conceptual framework that connects and strengthens the architect' s intuitive understanding of the human experience of space with the theorist's more critical approach. Phenomenology is an ideal vehicle
for architectural theorists to avoid the friction between first-hand or subjective experience and generalised or abstracted accounts of experience.
In this thesis I extract an account of the human experience of space that is implicit in the Philosopher Maurice Merleau-Pontys work. (i) I consider how this understanding has been employed in architectural scholarship and
practice. In particular, I argue that the human body renders the richness of space through deliberate engagement with the indeterminate and
independent possibilities of the world. In other words, as the body intentionally engages with the world, it synthesises objects that create determinate spatial situations. I account for Merleau-Ponty's depiction of the body' s non-rule governed, non-reflective, normative directiveness towards spaces and elements, and label it the thinking body.(ii) Furthermore I examine
how the philosophical theory of Merleau-Ponty is represented in the explicitly theoretical works of Juhani Pallasmaa. In turn I then consider how
the thinking body is physically and conceptually realised in the buildings of Carlo Scarpa.
Finally I find that Juhani Pallasmaa's description of the phenomenological experience of space is incompatible with Merleau-Ponty's. The strategic
importance of these different accounts emerges when projecting their implications for designed space. Pallasmaa' s account points towards an architecture that prioritises sensory experiences synthesised by the mind.(iii) The design focus of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy leads to spatial practices in line with Carlo Scarpa, that are sympathetic to the causal qualities of an intentional bodily engagement with spatial situations. In accord with Merleau-Ponty I argue that human body is our medium for the world and as such creates the spatial situation we engage with from a formless manifold of possibilities.
i This thesis benefits from my study of philosophy at the University of California at Berkeley, where my understanding of Merleau-Ponty has been inspired and clarified by Professor Hebert Dreyfus.
ii Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962). Phenomenology of Perception. Routledge, Taylor and Francis
Group, New York, NY. [110, 138]
iii Alberto Perez- Gomez, S. P., editor (2004). Chora: Intervals in the Philosophy of Architecture.
McGill-Queens Press. [158] Pallasmaa, J. (1996). The Eyes of the Skin. Academy Editions. [24]
