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CEO Presence on the Compensation Committee: A Puzzle

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dc.contributor.author Boyle, Glenn
dc.contributor.author Roberts, Helen
dc.date.accessioned 2015-02-11T21:39:34Z
dc.date.accessioned 2022-07-07T02:18:41Z
dc.date.available 2015-02-11T21:39:34Z
dc.date.available 2022-07-07T02:18:41Z
dc.date.copyright 18/03/2012
dc.date.issued 2012
dc.identifier.uri https://ir.wgtn.ac.nz/handle/123456789/19222
dc.description.abstract Conventional wisdom suggests that CEO membership of the compensation committee is an open invitation to rent extraction by self-serving executives. However using data from New Zealand - where CEO compensation committee membership is relatively common - we find that annual pay increments for CEOs with this apparent advantage averaged six percentage points less than those enjoyed by other CEOs during the 1997-2005 period. After controlling for variation in firm performance the difference is a still-sizeable four percentage points. This puzzling result cannot be explained by risk-return tradeoff considerations interaction with other governance variables selection bias or variable mis-measurement. en_NZ
dc.format pdf en_NZ
dc.language.iso en_NZ
dc.publisher Te Herenga Waka—Victoria University of Wellington en_NZ
dc.rights Permission to publish research outputs of the New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation has been granted to the Victoria University of Wellington Library. Refer to the permission letter in record: https://ir.wgtn.ac.nz/handle/123456789/18870 en_NZ
dc.title CEO Presence on the Compensation Committee: A Puzzle en_NZ
dc.type Text en_NZ
vuwschema.contributor.unit New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation en_NZ
vuwschema.contributor.unit Victoria Business School: Orauariki en_NZ
vuwschema.subject.anzsrcfor 149999 Economics not elsewhere classified en_NZ
vuwschema.type.vuw Working or Occasional Paper en_NZ
vuwschema.subject.anzsrcforV2 389999 Other economics not elsewhere classified en_NZ

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