School of Government · Te Kura Kāwanatanga: Institute for Governance and Policy Studies: Working and Policy Papers
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The Institute for Governance and Policy Studies (IPS) fosters discussion, research and publication of current issues of domestic and foreign policy. We particularly link academic research and public policy by providing opportunities for independent and detached study, and for neutral and informed discussion of important and relevant issues. Our goal is to engage the broadest possible range of informed opinion, particularly in drawing people together from the universities, the public service, the business community and the wider public community. Our three catchwords might be summed up as study, engage, inform.
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Browsing School of Government · Te Kura Kāwanatanga: Institute for Governance and Policy Studies: Working and Policy Papers by Author "Gill, Derek"
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Item Restricted Joint or Shared Accountability: Issues and Options(Te Herenga Waka—Victoria University of Wellington, 2011) Boston, Jonathan; Gill, DerekResponsible and responsive government depends on effective accountability – at all levels within the state. To this end, democratic governments have typically established strong vertical or hierarchical accountability relationships. New Zealand has been no exception. Indeed, the state sector reforms introduced in the late 1980s emphasised formal, vertical, straight-line accountability. Yet some of the work of government involves collaboration or joint working across multiple agencies. This implies the need for shared and horizontal accountability. It also casts doubt on the wisdom of relying too heavily on vertical accountability, not least because this may undermine joint working. How, then, should accountabilities be managed in the context of shared or joint working across agencies and what principles and considerations should guide policy makers when designing such accountability arrangements? With these issues in mind, this paper begins with an exploration of certain key concepts – vertical and horizontal accountability, responsibility, answerability and blame – and considers the limitations of vertical models of accountability within a Westminster-type parliamentary democracy. It then explores the nature and problems associated with joint working in the state sector where accountability for particular activities or outcomes is shared between two or more organisations. The paper argues that there are certain ‘hard’ factor and ‘soft factors’ that must be addressed to enable joint working. It is also argued that four key issues need to be considered when designing the institutional and associated accountability arrangements for joint working: depth, co-ordination and alignment, complexity, and separability. The paper concludes by exploring the ‘levers’ available to accommodate new ways of working across public agencies.Item Open Access Restructuring – an over-used lever for change in New Zealand’s state sector?(Te Herenga Waka—Victoria University of Wellington, 2011) Norman, Richard; Gill, DerekIs restructuring the hammer of organisational change in New Zealand’s state sector? A State Services Commission (SSC) survey of state sector employees in 2010 identified that 65 per cent of the 4,600 staff sampled had been involved in a merger or restructure during the previous two years, a sharp contrast with a similar survey of the federal government of the United States, which found that only 18 per cent were affected. These statistics raise questions which form the basis of this paper: why, how and to what effect are state sector organisations restructured in New Zealand? Our research started with a review of empirical data on restructuring and of perspectives from the literature on restructuring in the public and private sectors. We then explored these perspectives in three separate focus groups in May 2011, with chief executives, human resource managers and Public Service Association (PSA) delegates and organisers. Not surprisingly, chief executives (CEs) who initiate restructuring have a considerably more optimistic view about its role and impact than those who are affected by it. Annex One is a reflection piece written by one of the most experienced New Zealand public service chief executives, Christopher Blake, Chief Executive of the Department of Labour, (and Chief Executive of the New Zealand Symphony Orchestra from 2012), provides a balance to the more sceptical argument presented in this paper. We conclude that restructuring has indeed become the ‘hammer’ of organisational change in New Zealand, a result of the ‘freedom to manage’ formula adopted in the late 1980s to break up a unified and ‘career for life’ bureaucracy that was seen to respond to slowly to the economic crises of the 1980s. Restructuring has become almost an addiction, reinforced by short, fixed term contracts for chief executives and a belief by those chief executives that their employer, the State Services Commission, expects them to be seen to be ‘taking charge’. Restructuring is a symbol and sometimes and substitute for action. It treats organisations as though they are mechanical objects with interchangeable parts rather than as living systems of people who have choices about the extent to which they will commit to their work. Organisational change receives considerably less scrutiny than funding proposals for major capital works. We advocate that restructuring should be subject to such scrutiny and chief executives need to act more like stewards of their organisations and less like owners.