Alm, JamesHodge, Timothy R.Sands, GarySkidmore, Mark2014-01-312022-07-062014-01-312022-07-0620142014https://ir.wgtn.ac.nz/handle/123456789/18810In this paper we develop a theoretical model of the individual decision to become delinquent on one’s property tax payments. We then apply the model to the City of Detroit, Michigan, USA, where the city is in the midst of bankruptcy proceedings, and a rate of property tax delinquency of 48 percent, resulting in uncollected tax revenues of about 20 percent. We use detailed parcellevel data for Detroit to evaluate the factors that affect both the probability that a property owner is tax delinquent and, conditional upon delinquency, the magnitude of the delinquency. Our estimates show that properties that have lower value, longer police response times, are nonhomestead (non-owner occupied residential properties), have a higher statutory tax rate, have a higher assessed value relative to sales price, are owned by a financial institution or by a Detroit resident, are delinquent on water bills, and for which the probability of enforcement is low are more likely to be tax delinquent These findings can be used to inform policies targeted at improving tax compliance within the City.pdfen-NZProperty taxDelinquencyTax complianceProperty Tax Delinquency - Social Contract in Crisis: The Case of DetroitTextwww.victoria.ac.nz/sacl/about/cpf