Al Farooque, Omarvan Zijl, TonyDunstan, KeithaKarim, Wares2012-05-092022-07-052012-05-092022-07-0520052005https://ir.wgtn.ac.nz/handle/123456789/18674This paper models the managerial (board) ownership and financial performance relationship in Bangladesh using a simultaneous equations approach. This approach is deemed to be the most appropriate methodology to control for the potential endogenous relationship between managerial (board) ownership and performance. Consistent with recent literature employing this method of analysis in developed markets, we document a ‘reverseway’ causality of relationship between them in Bangladesh listed firms. Using an unbalanced/random pooled sample of 660 firm years, our results suggest that board ownership does not have a significant impact on performance as measured by Tobin’s Q or Return on Assets (“ROA”). However, performance does appear to have a significant negative impact on board ownership. With few exceptions, other corporate governance and control variables have effects on performance and ownership consistent with both theoretical and empirical expectations. These results imply that despite huge institutional and governance differences between Bangladesh, an emerging market economy, and developed countries (US, UK, Japan, Germany) there is nevertheless similarity in governance mechanisms, in particular, ‘internal governance mechanisms’ and agency problems.pdfen-NZemerging marketsCorporate GovernanceCorporate GovernanceFinancial PerformanceEndogeneitySimultaneous Equations‘Reverse-Way’ CausalityBangladeshText