Wijewickrama, Anusha2017-05-312022-07-112017-05-312022-07-1120162016https://ir.wgtn.ac.nz/handle/123456789/20243In 2015, New Zealand’s Supreme Court ruled in Dixon v R that digital files are property for the limited purposes of a computer misuse provision – s 249(1)(a) of the Crimes Act 1961. The Court said it was distinguishing digital files from pure information, thus it was not challenging the long-standing legal position that information cannot be property. This paper analyses the Court’s purposive, conceptual and factual reasoning, ultimately concluding that a distinction between digital files and information is difficult to justify. It argues that the Court’s decision therefore actually erodes the traditional legal position. It concludes that Parliament, which can more fully explore policy considerations, might be better placed to determine whether digital files should be property. Potential ramifications of the Supreme Court’s decision are also briefly outlined.pdfen-NZDigitalInformationPropertyDigital filesCrimes Act 1961 s 249(1)(a)Computer misuseText