Drawing out the cognitive foundations of imaginative thinking in autism spectrum disorders

Abstract

The syndrome of autism has been explained by citing core deficits in either theory of mind or executive functions. These deficit models have also been utilized to explain the imaginative deficits that are evident in autism. The theory of mind explanation suggests that the underlying conceptual processes used in thinking about mental states are also necessary for imaginative tasks, and consequently, due to mindblindness in autism, children with autism also show imaginative deficits. In contrast, the executive functions explanation suggests that performance rather than conceptual factors underlie poor autistic performance on imaginative tasks. Although studies of imaginative thinking in autism have suggested a pattern of capabilities and incapacity, very little is known about the correlates of imaginative skills in autism. The present study examines the developmental foundations of imaginative thinking among 24 participants with an autism spectrum disorder (mean age nine years). Participants were tested at two time points spaced two years apart on Karmiloff-Smith's (1990) imaginative drawing task and on a battery of tasks that provided measures of theory of mind, executive functioning (planning, inhibition and generativity), and verbal ability. Hierarchical regression analyses indicated a reciprocal relationship between generativity and imaginative drawing skill, independently of control variables (age and verbal ability). It is suggested that imaginative thinking and generativity are causally related to one-another in autism. Consequently, it is concluded that the present study provides support for executive (specifically generativity) explanations of imaginative thinking deficits in autism.