Voluntary Euthanasia and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Critical Analysis of the Seales v Attorney-General Decision

Abstract

The recent decision of Seales v Attorney-General clarified the law surrounding voluntary euthanasia in New Zealand. In addition to seeking declaratory judgment from the High Court as to the proper interpretation of certain provisions of the Crimes Act 1961, Lecretia Seales sought two declarations regarding sections 8 and 9 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. Specifically, that insofar as certain provisions of the Crimes Act restrict a person with a terminal and incurable illness from seeking life-ending medical assistance, the Crimes Act is inconsistent with a person’s rights not to be deprived of life and not to be subjected to torture or cruel treatment. This paper critiques Justice Collins’ conclusions that sections 8 and 9 of the Bill of Rights Act were not breached in Ms Seales’ tragic circumstances. Further, it argues that sections 8 and 9 of the Bill of Rights Act should extend to circumstances where people are suffering from terminal and incurable illnesses and recognise a right to seek life-ending medical assistance. Finally, the paper critiques the methodology used by the courts in New Zealand when assessing whether rights-infringing legislation is justified pursuant to section 5 of the Bill of Rights Act, and ultimately concludes that the courts should always query whether rights-infringing legislation serves a purpose sufficiently important to justify infringement of human rights. Further, the paper argues that the courts should exercise extreme caution in ascertaining the purpose of rights-infringing legislation, particularly statutes enacted prior to the Bill of Rights Act.