The case for subsidiarity in multi-level governance structures: perspectives from economics, political science and public law

Abstract

The paper deals with the importance of the principle of subsidiarity in multi-level governance structures and its effects on the allocation of competences. Multi-level governance structures are a significant part of political systems throughout the world. The allocation of competences within them determines the right of the different levels of government to legislate on certain policy areas that affect both the individual and the overall outcomes of the polity. The principle of subsidiarity provides a three-dimensional framework that establishes fundamental conditions for allocating competences, still leaving a broad spectrum of possible configurations. Each of the three scholarly disciplines of economics, political science and public law discusses the optimal allocation of competences and examines factors relevant for an optimal structure. This thesis undertakes a multi-disciplinary review and analysis of relevant theories from the three disciplines in order to deepen scholarly understanding of the allocation of competences and its determinants. The principle of subsidiarity provides a common lens for exploring the selected disciplines and proves to be a valuable source of insights into multi-level governance. In addition to counterbalancing the powerful single-market justification for centralisation of policy functions, the principle of subsidiarity also helps reconcile core values such as efficiency, diversity, equity, participation, and legal certainty while also facilitating prudence in the allocation of competence.