Consciousness as the interface between affect and cognition?

Abstract

This thesis examines the proposition that human consciousness is derived from the interaction between affect and cognition, that when reflective thinking drives action we have to observe our own responses to stimuli in order that the information be made available in a symbolic form available for processing. It is a bold hypothesis and if true would clear up many of the problems in explaining just what consciousness is and why it appears necessary for human existence. The issues are complex and there are many views on consciousness, but in the examination I have decided to confine myself to detailing the work which leads to the hypothesis, outlining a parallel investigation by one leading philosopher, and drawing upon my own resources and reading to formulate an opinion. The proposition is not without its merits, and these include the manner in which we have to deal with affect, and the presentation of a view on just what drives a mammalian creature All of this requires elaboration and this I attempt to give: for example what is affect, and what is the relationship between affect and our feelings about the way things are, and just how this information is to be brought to a usable form. The issues are complicated by the fact that not all behaviour is reflective, based on cognition, but some is reflexive, that is reactive, and there needs to be some investigation of the process by which one or the other form is selected. On all of these matters I reach a considerable degree of concurrence with the position of the authors of the study, the animal researchers Balleine and Dickinson. But consciousness is the principal issue, and the subject of it being the interface between affect and cognition I claim is a partial truth. Reaching that position is the thrust of this thesis. A subordinate but still very important issue is the manner of inessentialism, that is, why consciousness should be deemed essential to human activity when it may appear, certainly as a metaphysical possibility, that we could do quite well without it. This will form a background theme to the main question of the interface. My conclusion on inessentialism is both novel and surprising.