Grappling With Complacency: The Case For Reforming New Zealand's Constitutional Safeguards Of Ministerial Accountability

Abstract

In recent years other Westminster systems, specifically the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia, have been wrestling with how to deal with high profile ministerial integrity scandals. The same could potentially happen here, as there are major vulnerabilities in our constitutional system that mean we cannot be complacent on the issue of ministerial accountability. While New Zealand has not yet experienced major scandal because of its vulnerabilities nor does not it look likely to in the immediate future, this is largely because of luck rather than design. This paper seeks to explore these vulnerability and advocates for more engagement with the question of how we may improve our constitutional mechanisms for promoting ministerial accountability. These mechanisms are primarily: accountability to the prime minister, parliamentary oversight and the criminal law. The vulnerabilities in our current systems can be analysed through the application of Bovens’ accountability perspectives, which reveals the key accountability deficits in our system. These are particularly: a shortage of true independence given the reliance on self-policing and the interference of political factors, a lack of accountability bodies with educational and learning functions and the limitations of the criminal law due to its narrow remit and cumbersome processes. We should therefore think about how we can reform the current system. In doing so, there are lessons to be learned from how other Westminster jurisdictions have gone about trying to increase accountability for ministers, particularly the Independent Advisor on Minister’s Interests in the UK, the Canadian Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner and Australia’s range of Anti-Corruption Agencies. The result of the analysis in this paper is a range of broad principles to guide any future development in this area, for instance: the importance of truly independent bodies, the need for widespread public and political buy-in and the benefits of accountability bodies with wide remits. It is therefore important New Zealand starts on the journey of reform, to better equip us to face potential future scandals.