A Seamless System: Bureaucratic Politics and Organizational Process in the New Zealand Foreign Policy Community

Abstract

The standard model of bureaucratic politics found in the works of Graham Allison and Morton Halperin presents a picture of government organizations driven by parochial perceptions engaging in competition for resources or influence. The experience of the New Zealand foreign policy and intelligence community however, is a direct challenge to the conclusions of the standard model. Allison’s model of bureaucratic politics errs due to generalising from the American experience to all cases and misapplying the literature at the base of his model. Insights from neo-institutionalism demonstrate how centralised institutions, close personal relationships, official role conceptions, as well as New Zealand’s position in the international system engender anti-parochialism. Rather than bargain over distributional gains, interaction between departments focuses on robust debate and ‘problem solving’- expanding the search for policy alternatives to satisfy all participants. The New Zealand foreign policy community also displays significant differences from Allison’s Organizational Process model. This section examines the generation of alternatives, performance standards and advancement, short-term adaptation and long-term planning, cognitive limitations, and organizational memory. Finally, this thesis examines recent reforms to the policy system that aim to create a more integrated foreign policy and intelligence community. Bureaucratic politics and organizational process also function at overseas diplomatic posts. Yet, again the standard model fails to adequately describe the interaction between Wellington and diplomatic posts as independent action by overseas staff is less likely than previously noted and communication is much higher. The Australian and Chinese foreign policy systems provide shadow cases that also show significant deviations from the standard model. Australia, much like New Zealand, relies on centralised institutions to enforce close collaboration between departments and defies the ‘bargaining’ mode of interaction. Meanwhile, bureaucratic politics in China are in their infancy, with horizontal linkages between departments still under-formed and heavy reliance on vertical integrating mechanisms. These cases reinforce the propositions of the New Zealand case and confirm the neo-institutionalist model as a more robust theory of bureaucratic politics.