Causality in science and in everyday discourse

Abstract

In the way of introducing my subject it will be appropriate to define, in the first place, the terms employed in the title (A): (1) 'Causality' , the first term, cannot be defined conveniently at this stage because the following ten chapters are largely devoted to the elucidation of its meaning. However, certain statements about causality are so general that they do not fit into my classification and so they are useful to define the term used in the title. Thus causality appears to me as a basic problem of epistemology, a problem with which philosophers have wrangled for 2,000 years. To attempt its solution in general might seem foolhardy yet a better understanding of scientific methodology has brought us to a point at which an answer can be seriously contemplated at least for causality in science and in ordinary discourse. My main purpose will be to study the content rather than the grounds of causal statements, i.e. how we derive our knowledge of such propositions, consequently I shall have little to say about induction. In other words, I shall attempt to answer the question "What do we mean when we say 'A causes B?" and not the question "How do we know that 'A causes B?" When asking what is the content of causal statements we are asking for an analysis of the concept of causality. The concept of causality is a conventional designation for certain properties, relations and functions. 'Concept' does not refer to the term (i.e. the word) causality but to its meanings; and it does not refer to mental occurrences of conceiving but to something objective (Carnap, Logical foundations). The term 'causality' is, of course inexact, otherwise no analysis would be necessary.