Substance : with particular reference to Aristotle's Metaphysics

Abstract

This thesis is a bit of a mixture. It is primarily concerned with an exposition and analysis of certain concepts which figure prominently in the central books of Aristotle's Metaphysics. However, I have not confined myself solely to a consideration of passages from Aristotle, but have at times used the exegetical discussions as stepping-stones to an investigation into some of the broader issues which they raise. This is especially true of the last chapter, to which much of the preceding chapters served as background, and it is here that I deal with my main topic, namely, an attempt to show that the concept of substance is, or at least can be, a meaningful concept, and that our choice in this matter does not, as is often implied, lie between positing an unknowable Lockian substratum on the one hand, and, on the other, adopting a phenomenalist epistemology. With regard to those sections concerned with specifically Aristotelian concepts, my chief sources of help have been articles by Elizabeth Anscombe, Peter Geach, and Ellen Stone Haring, references to which, together with the other most helpful works consulted, may be found in the bibliography. I have also at times had occasion to refer to Aquinas, largely for the purposes of filling out points covered only sketchily by Aristotle, but it should be borne in mind that my concern here is with Aristotle rather than Saint Thomas, and that references to the latter are by no means intended to provide an adequate exposition of his thought on this subject.