Symbolism and Knowledge of Things

Abstract

One of the important developments in recent philosophy has been the growth of the study of symbolism and semantics. It has shown the importance of symbolism in human behaviour, and how necessary it is to understand it. Such an understanding not only increases the accuracy with which we can talk about human behaviour as well as everything else we discuss, but is an essential part of the understanding of human behaviour itself. The distinctively human capacity to convey meaning through a developed language system is of course one of the main objects of this type of study. Many problems have been clarified by the careful analysis of the words in which they are expressed. Complex propositions are seldom "neutral" but consist of more or less adequate symbols which may have a variety of different meanings, and, when not clearly understood, may provide the basis for misleading inferences. The words of a language system are only one sort of symbol, but our ability to use them as a means of communication is a specific characteristic of human beings as rational creatures. This emphasis on language is the basis of a book such as Susan Langer's Philosophy in a new key. It not only shows its importance as the basis of our rational capacities, but seem to indicate that it has an extremely importance influence on what we know, and how we know it. Within the limits of what Langer calls "discursive" forms of experience I am expected to be able to express what I "know" in words-- "knowing" here meaning "knowing that", e.g. knowing that the sea is blue, not "knowing how", e.g. knowing how to ride a bicycle. This limitation of the discussion to a narrow interpretation of "knowledge" and bypassing the question of whether aesthetic, ethical and metaphysical knowledge (knowledge of values) is of the same sort, or rather has equal objectiveness does not presume a negative answer to this question. It is necessary to limit the discussion in order to begin from the simplest situations. The suggestions put forward here seem compatible with the objective validity of this type of judgement, though they only indicate a lime of approach.