Practical reason

Abstract

I shall be concerned in this essay to say something about morality. Of necessity therefore I shall be saying something about action. When a person acts he expresses his will. My thesis, one of those first maintained by Immanuel Kant, will be that the will is practical reason, and that the will is good insofar as it conforms to the dictates of pure practical reason. In order to show this I shall examine, very briefly, specifically human action. I shall contend that this, which is obviously practical, follows rational principles, and is uncaused. I shall further argue that right action is that which is completely determined "Determined by" is ambiguous. Here it means "recognised because of its accordance with", not "caused by". by rational principles. In the case of much human action, rational principles are not the sole determining "Determined by" is ambiguous. Here it means "recognised because of its accordance with", not "caused by". factors. Such action will be to some degree wrong. Only action which is affirmatively subject to the fundamental principle of morality, which is a rational principle, is right. Such action is the way a good will expresses itself. There is ample room within right action for the satisfaction of desire and the expression of emotion, but activities pursuing these ends must be ordered subject to a rational principle if they are to be morally right. One way of expressing one of the contentions I shall seek to uphold is to say that moral rightness is validity of choice. Further, the principles by which the validity of choice is tested are themselves rational. So we are considering what we mean by human action and what we mean by reason. We consider the meaning of rational activity. It is free or uncaused and yet follows rules and principles. Insofar as the agent's will is good, rational principles are what governs his actions.