Property rights based fisheries management: lessons from New Zealand's quota management system

Abstract

Economic theory predicts that establishing property rights structures for natural resources will reduce common environmental problems associated with degradation and depletion of open access resources (widely referred to as "the tragedy of the commons"). The owner of such property rights theoretically has a strong incentive to protect resources and promote efficient resource use. In recent years, this economic theory has been applied to environmental management problems ranging from air and water pollution to extractive resources. This thesis examines the implementation of New Zealand's Quota Management System (QMS) for fisheries as an example of a property rights based resource management regime. Analysis of the QMS suggests a divergence between the incentives theoretically created by property rights institutions and the actions of those that control fisheries harvesting rights in New Zealand. Both existing institutional arrangements and the direction of evolving management trends create substantial risks for effective fisheries management under the QMS. Of particular concern is the limited nature of the current information base regarding the biological, economic, and social impacts of the regime. Because monitoring and evaluation systems are significantly under-developed, accurate assessment of QMS implementation effects is not currently possible. In short, although the QMS establishes a potentially effective method of achieving New Zealand's objective of sustainable utilisation of its fisheries resources, flaws in current implementation of the regime undermine its ability to meet this goal. Furthermore, because the QMS is focused on commercial utilisation of fisheries resources, many non-commercial and ecosystem values associated with New Zealand's marine environment do not receive adequate protection under the regime.