'Rogue states', missile defence & Cold War nuclear rivals

Abstract

The Bush administration's planned deployment of a nation-wide and layered missile defence system has ignited heated debate. Arms control advocates have argued missile defence will unravel nuclear arms agreements whilst other analysts proclaim that the so-called 'rogue state' threat is inadequate to justify the system. This thesis rejects both assertions and argues that there is indeed a sound strategic rationale for the deployment of missile defence. Chapter one provides the background information for a contemporary analysis of missile defence. This chapter outlines the Cold War strategic concerns that gave rise to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the prohibition of a nationwide missile defence system. The Reagan administration's planned Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) receives particular emphasis. The chapter highlights how the planned weaponisation of space ignited significant strategic concerns from the Soviet Union and China. This Cold War concern, it will be shown, is at the basis of contemporary Russian and Chinese opposition to missile defence. Some writers have argued that a 'rogue state' threat does not exist. Chapter two reponds to these claim by outlining the inherent complications of strategic intelligence assessments and how formulating a completely accurate account of North Korea and Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile capability is difficult. Despite these complications the chapter argues that North Korea and Iran are pursuing a plutonium and uranium-based nuclear weapon. Both nations also have an effective and clearly visible medium-range ballistic missile arsenal. Although there is limited evidence of an operational nuclear-armed long range ballistic missile, the foundation for a nuclear-armed long-range 'rogue state' is starting to emerge.