Governance, not politics: the statecraft of the New Zealand Labour Party, 1990 - 2002

Abstract

The study of political parties is fundamental to modern political science. A powerful but under-utilised approach to the study of political parties is that of party statecraft. In 1986 Bulpitt argued that statecraft is essentially the strategy used by a party to gain office, govern competently and retain office. Bulpitt identified four dimensions in which party statecraft is manifest; political argument hegemony, governing competence, party management and electoral strategy. Statecraft is thus concerned as much with the "how" of politics as the "why". The recent history of the New Zealand Labour Party provides a remarkable case study in the art and development of statecraft. This thesis examines the development and implementation of a new party statecraft by the New Zealand Labour Party in the period 1990 to 2002. In 1990 the Labour Party suffered the worst defeat in a general election in it's history. In the nine years following this defeat, the Labour Party attempted to come to terms with both the passing of their traditional ideology, and the electorate's rejection of the strategy they adopted in the 1980's. The party sought inspiration from the British Labour Party's third way project, and attempted to develop a third way party statecraft for the New Zealand context. At the core of the third way is the notion that, in order to win office, social democratic parties should move beyond the political divisions of left and right, and embrace all of the mechanisms and strategies used by parties of the left, and the right, in order to achieve their goals. Social democratic parties should shape themselves, not as political parties, but rather as governing parties. In this way, social democratic parties are able to span both sides of the political spectrum and undercut opponents to the left and right. By "taking the politics out of politics", social democratic parties can become "the natural party of government". The central question of this thesis is whether the third way party statecraft, which enabled Labour to win office in 1999, has enabled Labour to achieve political argument hegemony, governing competence, effective party management and a winning electoral strategy in office. Since taking office in 1999, Labour has set the framework for, and won, political debate in New Zealand. With the adoption of the third way, and its associated language. Labour has achieved an easy predominance in political rhetoric. Though few members of the public appear to have adopted Labour's new lexicon, the substance of the language, the reconciliation of left and the right, has helped shape political debate in New Zealand. More crucially, Labour's core political argument, that globalisation has undermined the power of the state to discharge many of the functions it has previously undertaken, has enabled Labour to exclude difficult issues from the public agenda, and dismiss questions of the effectiveness of Labour's policy solutions, such as their level of funding for public services. The third way has also enabled Labour to achieve the remaining dimensions of party statecraft. Despite some high profile arguments over Labour's new industrial relations legislation and Closing the Gaps programme, Labour has managed to develop a widespread sense of governing competence amongst the electorate. Of the four dimensions of party statecraft, party management is perhaps the least reflective of a broader statecraft strategy. There has been no new third way style of party management, rather in office Helen Clark has continued to pursue the dominant style of party management she developed in Opposition. The development of Labour's third way electoral strategy has been characterized by attempts to improve their electoral marketing, secure both the centre vote, and the Maori vote. In preparation for the 2002 election, and in light of the break up of the Alliance, Labour has also begun to develop a new electoral strategy, which involves reaching out to the Greens as a possible future coalition partner. Over the longer term, however, the most critical challenge for Labour, and their third way party statecraft, lies in the realm of vision. Labour argues that while visions once gave shape and meaning to the competition between left and right in New Zealand politics, for contemporary political parties the risk of promising too much by promulgating a vision of the ideal society is too great. Helen Clark observes "Visions can fuel disappointment and disengagement as easily as they can lift up people's hearts and minds." For Labour "the power of the state has been so undermined by the forces of globalisation, political parties can no longer present visions of the ideal society, simply because they can no longer build the ideal society." This argument goes to the core of Labour's governance, not politics statecraft - where the absence of vision is the vision.