The problems of reorientation in New Zealand's defence and foreign policies under the fourth Labour Government (1984-1990): a case study of the ANZUS dispute

Abstract

New Zealand's decision to reorientate its defence and foreign policies in 1984 created problems not only for itself at a national level, but has also entangled it in a dispute with its remaining ANZUS partners, Australia and the United States. The impact and outcome of the dispute throughout 1984-1990 is the main theme of this thesis, which is focused on systems analysis. ANZUS is viewed as a system with certain structural and functional requirements orientated to operating in the 1980's. Central to the study is an identification and analysis of the forces that contributed to New Zealand's reorientation. These include the role of the Labour Party's historical experiences and its evaluation of the country's role in the alliance. The New Zealand Labour Government took a path towards semi-alignment, by unilaterally viewing the alliance in conventional terms but without rejecting its membership. A model of Relative Security is applied to examine New Zealand's consistency via four indicators. These are decoupling from superpower strategy; maintaining a non-aggressive policy; keeping a degree of invulnerability; and pursuing an active peace policy. The application of this model shows that New Zealand succeeded in maintaining a consistency at the national level. The country survived politically from a series of United States actions: e.g. a curtailment in defence cooperation, an elimination of security guarantee, and isolation from alliance cooperation. In response, New Zealand produced a series of policies which supported Relative Security. These were the establishment of the Defence Committee of Enquiry, the introduction of the 1987 Defence White Paper and an enactment of the Anti-Nuclear Legislation. At a broader scope of security we find that the management of the environmental issue enabled New Zealand to cooperate with the United States, which enabled the latter to relax its political isolation of New Zealand. At the regional level we find that New Zealand's semi-alignment showed a paradox, given its alignment with Australia, which, in turn, maintained a very close defence association with the United States. Closer ANZAC defence cooperation reinforced another dependency, as New Zealand grew more reliant on Australia for military interoperability, defence materials and intelligence supplies. New Zealand's readiness to join the ANZAC frigates purchase showed a further entanglement with Australia's strategic outlook. On the international stage, we find that New Zealand's policy faced shortcomings. New Zealand's desire to be part of the western security community has limited its capacity to challenge doctrines of nuclear deterrence. The impact of New Zealand's non-participation has not damaged the ANZUS alliance. A regulatory mechanism was organized by Australia by conducting two separate defence cooperations with New Zealand and the United States. The notion of regional stability was relatively undisturbed, since the dispute did not affect the pro-western South Pacific.