Memory and the experience of the passage of time

Abstract

Accounts of the experience of time's passage begin by claiming that we really do have this experience, and then divide over whether the experience is veridical or illusory. Those who claim that it is illusory need to explain why we think we have the experience. Unfortunately, the explanations offered to date have missed their mark. Worse still, they make mistaken claims about the role of memory; there is little reference to cognitive science. This thesis examines accounts of why we think we experience time's passage, and then offers an alternative, and after considering the claims made about it, settles the role memory plays in the experience. The experience comes from the judgment that a current experience has replaced an earlier one, and memory is vital because this judgment is mediated by the interaction of current perceptions and memory. The crucial memory function is episodic long-term memory. To test all these claims I look at sufferers of the amnesic syndrome to see whether having lost their episodic long-term memory, they have also lost their experience of the passage of time. I argue that they have, and that therefore episodic long-term memory is important, and the account of the experience offered in this thesis is to be preferred over others.