Consciousness & cognition

Abstract

The problem of mind should be divided into two areas that will need two different sorts of explanation. The areas are (broadly) Consciousness, the fact that we have experiences, and Cognition, the fact that we reason, perceive and so on. The main contemporary theory of the mind is Functionalism, where details of implementation are abstracted away from and it is fulfilling particular functional roles that is definitive of mental states. This line is usually associated with modern Cognitive theorizing, which views the mind as an information processing organ. My central claim is that no cognitive/computational description can not provide necessary and sufficient conditions for consciousness. There could be entities that are as intelligent, that are cognitively equivalent, to you or me, and yet they would not be conscious. The issues concerning the equivalence of computational processes are complex. I conclude that the relevant level to compare processes is that of algorithmic equivalence. But a simple nonconscious Universal computing machine can realize any computational structure and realize any computational process even at this most fine-grained level. A number of proposed remedies for problems facing Functionalism are discussed. They fail to help the theories explain consciousness as they appeal to extrinsic facts, and an example is developed to show that it is only intrinsic features that matter. I conclude by suggesting a possible solution for the problem of consciousness, a Type-identity theory. This does however leave certain explanatory matters adrift. Some more possible remedies for the computational theories are discussed.