Wittgenstein vs Quine: this time it's behavioural

Abstract

Two of the most prominent philosophers of the Twentieth Century, Ludwig Wittgenstein and W. V. O. Quine, presented behaviourist arguments in the philosophy of language. However, the kind and extent to which their positions are committed to behaviourism are markedly different, a difference that flows over to the versions of holism in which both ground their accounts of language. This thesis is an examination of the behaviourism and commitment to holism present in both Wittgenstein's and Quine's account of language. I shall argue that the description of language presented by Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations (1953) captures the theory of language argued for by Quine in Word and Object (1960). Further, I shall show that Wittgenstein's description of language, while holistic, can be defended against charges of circularity, and yet retain determinacy in interpretations of language understanding, intended actions and linguistic meaning.