dc.contributor.author |
Barrett, Maxine Frances |
|
dc.date.accessioned |
2011-07-13T21:32:21Z |
|
dc.date.accessioned |
2022-10-27T00:44:17Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2011-07-13T21:32:21Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2022-10-27T00:44:17Z |
|
dc.date.copyright |
1986 |
|
dc.date.issued |
1986 |
|
dc.identifier.uri |
https://ir.wgtn.ac.nz/handle/123456789/25342 |
|
dc.description.abstract |
Newcomb's problems have been advanced as counterexamples to any decision theory employing the principle of maximising conditional expected utility. David Lewis has proposed a revision of decision theory. He insists that only beliefs about the causal consequences of an act can count as a rational basis for choice. Lewis suggests that these beliefs are best expressed by counterfactual conditionals. I will argue that Lewis's claims about the way these expressions are standardly understood are unsupportable, and if these expressions are used in a decision context the paradoxical element in Newcomb's examples persist. |
en_NZ |
dc.format |
pdf |
en_NZ |
dc.language |
en_NZ |
|
dc.language.iso |
en_NZ |
|
dc.publisher |
Te Herenga Waka—Victoria University of Wellington |
en_NZ |
dc.title |
Decision, cause and counterfactuals |
en_NZ |
dc.type |
Text |
en_NZ |
vuwschema.type.vuw |
Awarded Research Masters Thesis |
en_NZ |
thesis.degree.discipline |
Philosophy |
en_NZ |
thesis.degree.grantor |
Te Herenga Waka—Victoria University of Wellington |
en_NZ |
thesis.degree.level |
Masters |
en_NZ |