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Decision, cause and counterfactuals

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dc.contributor.author Barrett, Maxine Frances
dc.date.accessioned 2011-07-13T21:32:21Z
dc.date.accessioned 2022-10-27T00:44:17Z
dc.date.available 2011-07-13T21:32:21Z
dc.date.available 2022-10-27T00:44:17Z
dc.date.copyright 1986
dc.date.issued 1986
dc.identifier.uri https://ir.wgtn.ac.nz/handle/123456789/25342
dc.description.abstract Newcomb's problems have been advanced as counterexamples to any decision theory employing the principle of maximising conditional expected utility. David Lewis has proposed a revision of decision theory. He insists that only beliefs about the causal consequences of an act can count as a rational basis for choice. Lewis suggests that these beliefs are best expressed by counterfactual conditionals. I will argue that Lewis's claims about the way these expressions are standardly understood are unsupportable, and if these expressions are used in a decision context the paradoxical element in Newcomb's examples persist. en_NZ
dc.format pdf en_NZ
dc.language en_NZ
dc.language.iso en_NZ
dc.publisher Te Herenga Waka—Victoria University of Wellington en_NZ
dc.title Decision, cause and counterfactuals en_NZ
dc.type Text en_NZ
vuwschema.type.vuw Awarded Research Masters Thesis en_NZ
thesis.degree.discipline Philosophy en_NZ
thesis.degree.grantor Te Herenga Waka—Victoria University of Wellington en_NZ
thesis.degree.level Masters en_NZ

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