The modular mind: a critical analysis of Jerry Fodor's theory of modularity and select post-Fodor developments

Abstract

Recently, a particular theory of the mind known as 'faculty psychology' is once again in favour. The basic idea of faculty psychology is that the mind can be divided into a range of functionally discreet components, called 'faculties'. Traditional accounts of faculty psychology posit such faculties as: the faculty of memory, the faculty of judgement, the faculty of mathematics, music and so on. Until fairly recently, the theory of Associationism rendered the view of faculty psychology unpopular. However, with arguments from such thinkers as Noam Chomsky, David Marr, and Jerry Fodor, faculty psychology is yet again a serious theory in the philosophy of mind (as well as psychology, neuropsychology and so on). This thesis will assume that some kind of variation of faculty psychology is right. In particular, this thesis will examine Jerry Fodor's spin on the theory of faculty psychology. Fodor argues that the mind is full of 'modules' - discreet functional components that perform functions such as visual recognition, language recognition, sound recognition and so on. Fodor also thinks that they simple subserve the main part of the mind- the central processor. Fodor thinks that the central processor is the centre of belief fixation- where you can have such thoughts as 'I believe in the Trinity' and so on. This kind of mental process will not occur in the modules- they are purely perceptual mechanism, as opposed to being conceptual. This will be located in Chapter 1. The prime aim of this thesis is to examine Fodor's notion of modularity, and then to examine some theorists who have taken the notion of modularity and applied it to their own particular theories. The theorists I will cover are: Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, along with Dan Sperber- who wish to take the notion of modularity and apply it within the evolution of the mind; Philip Gerrans, who applies the notion of modularity to mental disorders, and Max Coltheart- who argues that the modules Fodor presents can be sub-divided into smaller modules. Their theories will be discussed in Chapter 2 The discussion areas of my thesis can be split into three basic parts. The first part, located in Chapter 3, critically examines arguments that claim that modules are best defined either as encapsulated systems, or domain specific. Fodor argues that modules are best thought of encapsulated (although he stops short of defining them as encapsulated). The post-Fodor theorists that I will examine all argue for domain specificity as the criterion for modularity, except for Phil Gerrans. Gerrans appears to argue for a functionally autonomous criterion for modularity- modules are those functions that can either he selectively damaged, or can continue to function normally while other modules around them are damaged. I will define modules as encapsulated, and argue that this criterion works better than domain specificity. I will also argue that encapsulation is compatible with Gerrans' notion of modularity, but it remains unclear as to whether it really is the reason for this functional autonomy. I will then look at two attempts to describe the mind as wholly modular. These arguments are presented by Dan Sperber, and Cosmides and Tooby. Both rest on the claim that evolution by natural selection can produce only modules- and not a central processor. Dan Sperber will attempt to present his own model by arguing that simple perceptual modules can evolve into what he calls the 'meta-representation' module- a conceptual module. I will argue that Sperber's meta- representation module looks exactly like Fodor's central processor- a device most theorists would claim is definitely NOT modular. Cosmides and Tooby will argue for a completely modular mind- made up of modules each doing specific tasks- producing an effect that looks like the human mind. I argue that their approach has serious flaws. For example- they believe we have a social exchange module. Because they think that modules are highly functionally restricted- they will not be very flexible. I will argue that this social exchange module will be exploited by cheaters- if they are a new phenomenon that social exchange modules had never encountered before. Also, there is an argument that the operation of these modules will not produce any mental integration- something that we as humans seem to do reliably all of the time. Finally in Chapter 5-1 will look at their adaptationist methodology. I will argue that the claims they base off this methodology will be hard for them to test. Also, I will look at Celia Heyes' argument that phylogenetic reconstruction is not the only route with which we can account for the existence of modules in the mind.