Believing and knowing

Abstract

For the philosopher problems about belief lie in three areas. (1) Logical problems such as 'What are believed? Facts? sentences? Propositions?' 'What is the effect on the truth of a statement containing the word 'belief' if that word is repeated?' 'Are the paradoxes of the logic of Indirect Discourse insurmountable?' (2) Problems concerning Religious belief, such as, 'Is the word "Belief" used in religious contexts the same way as in ordinary speech, and if not is its use common and consistent enough to avoid being nonsensical?' 'How like a passion is religious belief?' 'Is believing more meritorious than understanding?' (3) Epistemological problems such as 'How can we know when a person believes something?' 'What do we mean when we say that a belief is true?' 'Is believing a lesser form of knowing?'