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Nietzsche's theory of value

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dc.contributor.author Fernandez, Linda
dc.date.accessioned 2011-07-13T21:02:56Z
dc.date.accessioned 2022-10-27T00:26:27Z
dc.date.available 2011-07-13T21:02:56Z
dc.date.available 2022-10-27T00:26:27Z
dc.date.copyright 1981
dc.date.issued 1981
dc.identifier.uri https://ir.wgtn.ac.nz/handle/123456789/25304
dc.description.abstract Nietzsche's prime concern is with the meaning of existence. He felt that in order to answer satisfactorily the question of the value of life an adequate account of truth was needed. Nietzsche overcame his own nihilistic crisis through the creation of the supra-moral perspective on truth. The diversity which characterizes mankind's conceptions of truth and value is rendered meaningful, Nietzsche suggests, if truth is regarded as perspectival and subject to a developmental progression. The complexity and comprehensiveness of a conception of truth provide a basis on which to classify any particular conception of truth as being more or less developed than other conceptions of truth. The idea of a developmental progression in man's conception of truth enabled Nietzsche to perceive continuity in the diverse range of human beliefs and to evaluate the worth of any particular conception, since each stage in the development of truth represents an advance on the previous stage by refining and extending the earlier concepts. Having denied that truth is absolute, to remain consistent Nietzsche needed to ensure that any view of the nature of truth that he advanced did not entail the same criticisms he had levelled at the correspondence theory of truth. The difficulty Nietzsche overcame was to create a conception of truth which was neither absolute nor relative. viewed supra-morally truth is neither absolute since it is perspectival nor completely relative since it is tied to human evolution and development. Valued according to its own criterion, the supra-moral perspective is good since it conceives of truth in a more complex and comprehensive manner and facilitates future development by defining truth as something which evolves. It is a more advanced conception of truth since it allows man to transcend the limitations on the development of thought imposed by a view dominated by the belief that antithetical beliefs are mutually exclusive. Bennett argues that Nietzsche considered such antithetical beliefs and values as mutually exclusive in thought but inseparable in existence. If this is so, then the supra-moral perspective allows man to transcend the view of truth as either absolute or totally relative since these antithetical conceptions of truth are now seen as inseparable in reality. en_NZ
dc.format pdf en_NZ
dc.language en_NZ
dc.language.iso en_NZ
dc.publisher Te Herenga Waka—Victoria University of Wellington en_NZ
dc.title Nietzsche's theory of value en_NZ
dc.type Text en_NZ
vuwschema.type.vuw Awarded Research Masters Thesis en_NZ
thesis.degree.discipline Philosophy en_NZ
thesis.degree.grantor Te Herenga Waka—Victoria University of Wellington en_NZ
thesis.degree.level Masters en_NZ
thesis.degree.name Master of Arts en_NZ


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