Disarmament versus security: New Zealand & the Singapore strategy, 1921 - 1942

Abstract

The goal of this study is to examine the nature of the New Zealand response to and involvement in the Singapore strategy between 1921 and 1942. To effectively do this the interplay between disarmament and security as it related to the Singapore strategy and the relationship between the New Zealand government and the British Imperial government has been considered. This study demonstrates the development of an assertive New Zealand foreign policy. That policy was influenced strongly by the actions of the British government to reduce its expenditure. This was essential due to economic constraints and also the desire that flowed from the First World War to ensure a lasting peace. This was not a goal that New Zealand was opposed to. There was, however, a difference of opinion over what steps should be taken to secure the peace. The New Zealand view, expressed consistently throughout the period, was that to ensure peace, a balance of power had to be maintained through the provision of an effective level of military security. The British government, especially the two Labour Governments, saw the issue in terms of disarmament. They felt that the most effective way to ensure peace was to pursue a disarmament policy as quickly as possible. They did not see a need to counter this with an effective defence policy in spite of concern that New Zealand was forced to accept disarmament because it did not have the capability or options to pursue an independent defence policy of its own. Because of the Imperial structure the New Zealand government was forced to ratify three disarmament treaties that it did not necessarily support. The research approach I adopted to reach these conclusions was to look at the nature of New Zealand's involvement in both international disarmament conferences and Imperial forums, such as Imperial Conferences, to establish how New Zealand attempted to influence the balance between disarmament and security between 1921 and 1942. This is not a general study of New Zealand defence policy but rather a specific discussion of the Singapore strategy. The purpose of discussions of New Zealand defence policy, in this study, are to locate New Zealand's Singapore policy within a wider debate about the current and future defence requirements at the time. The Singapore strategy did not exist outside of the rest of New Zealand defence and Imperial policy. Therefore, this study has to be located within the context of these wider debates. With this in mind I selected a variety of secondary sources that approach the issues from a British Imperial viewpoint and a New Zealand one. The primary sources used were mainly memos, letters and reports held by the New Zealand National Archives from the Navy Department, Governor General of New Zealand and the Department of External Affairs. I also surveyed a variety of New Zealand newspapers from the period.