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Vietnam's WTO agricultural negotiation: extortion at the gate

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dc.contributor.author Nguyen, Hong Anh
dc.date.accessioned 2011-03-28T20:31:57Z
dc.date.accessioned 2022-10-25T07:12:01Z
dc.date.available 2011-03-28T20:31:57Z
dc.date.available 2022-10-25T07:12:01Z
dc.date.copyright 2006
dc.date.issued 2006
dc.identifier.uri https://ir.wgtn.ac.nz/handle/123456789/23521
dc.description.abstract This study examines Vietnam's accession to the WTO with a particular regard to its agricultural negotiation. Vietnam applied to join the WTO in January 1995. The Working Group was established on January 31, 1995 consisting of 43 member countries. Vietnam completed its last market access bilateral talks in March 2006 with the US and Mexico. Ten years on since the start of the accession process, the door to the most powerful trading club - the WTO has almost been opened for Vietnam - the most populous country member since China acceded. Vietnam's accession to the WTO has been an uneven process. Like most developing countries, especially those that have acceded to the WTO recently such as China, Nepal and Cambodia, Vietnam has faced many imbalances in its agricultural negotiation. Member countries push Vietnam to steeply reduce its agricultural tariffs, renounce the use of tariff rate quotas, eliminate all import-export restriction measures even those for health reasons and food security, limit domestic support within the deminimis level, and immediately phase out all its export subsidies which are allowed to continue by 2013 in the EU. If these obligations are taken into effect, Vietnam's "infant" sectors such as salt and sugar will be put into great disadvantage, incomes and livelihoods of farmers and professional workers working in processing mills will be seriously jeopardized. Furthermore, the country's food security will also be adversely affected. All these potentially damaging consequences will directly affect recent gains in Vietnam's development and imperil the progress in poverty reduction. Member countries, therefore, should allow Vietnam to use special provisions granted to developing countries and to maintain protection measures for development purposes. These proposals are not beyond what have been agreed in the Doha Development Agenda adopted by all WTO member countries. en_NZ
dc.format pdf en_NZ
dc.language en_NZ
dc.language.iso en_NZ
dc.publisher Te Herenga Waka—Victoria University of Wellington en_NZ
dc.title Vietnam's WTO agricultural negotiation: extortion at the gate en_NZ
dc.type Text en_NZ
vuwschema.type.vuw Awarded Research Masters Thesis en_NZ
thesis.degree.discipline Development Studies en_NZ
thesis.degree.grantor Te Herenga Waka—Victoria University of Wellington en_NZ
thesis.degree.level Masters en_NZ
thesis.degree.name Master of Development Studies en_NZ


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