Equitable estoppel with particular regard to its effect on the law relating to the discharge of contractual obligations

Abstract

In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries it was established by Courts of the highest authority that both at Common Law and in Equity only a representation of existing fact would suffice to establish an estoppel. In Jordon v. Money (1854), 5 H.L.C. 185. a case in Equity, Contrary to a popular misconception - see Cheshire & Fifoot - Law of Contract (5th Ed. 1960), 82; Gray v. Lang (1955), 56 S.R. (N.S.W.) 7, 12. Lord Cranworth, L.C., stated: (1854), 5 H.L.C. 185, 213-214. ... I think that doctrine (estoppel) does not apply to a case where the representation is not a representation of a fact but a statement of something which the party intends or does not intend to do. In Citizens' Bank of Louisiana v. First National Bank of New Orleans, (1873), L.R. 6 H.L. 352. Lord Selborne was more forthright. Ibid., 360.