dc.contributor.author | Fernyhough, Colin John | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-03-07T00:14:48Z | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-10-25T03:46:57Z | |
dc.date.available | 2011-03-07T00:14:48Z | |
dc.date.available | 2022-10-25T03:46:57Z | |
dc.date.copyright | 1961 | |
dc.date.issued | 1961 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://ir.wgtn.ac.nz/handle/123456789/23069 | |
dc.description.abstract | In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries it was established by Courts of the highest authority that both at Common Law and in Equity only a representation of existing fact would suffice to establish an estoppel. In Jordon v. Money (1854), 5 H.L.C. 185. a case in Equity, Contrary to a popular misconception - see Cheshire & Fifoot - Law of Contract (5th Ed. 1960), 82; Gray v. Lang (1955), 56 S.R. (N.S.W.) 7, 12. Lord Cranworth, L.C., stated: (1854), 5 H.L.C. 185, 213-214. ... I think that doctrine (estoppel) does not apply to a case where the representation is not a representation of a fact but a statement of something which the party intends or does not intend to do. In Citizens' Bank of Louisiana v. First National Bank of New Orleans, (1873), L.R. 6 H.L. 352. Lord Selborne was more forthright. Ibid., 360. | en_NZ |
dc.format | en_NZ | |
dc.language | en_NZ | |
dc.language.iso | en_NZ | |
dc.publisher | Te Herenga Waka—Victoria University of Wellington | en_NZ |
dc.title | Equitable estoppel with particular regard to its effect on the law relating to the discharge of contractual obligations | en_NZ |
dc.type | Text | en_NZ |
vuwschema.type.vuw | Awarded Research Masters Thesis | en_NZ |
thesis.degree.discipline | Law | en_NZ |
thesis.degree.grantor | Te Herenga Waka—Victoria University of Wellington | en_NZ |
thesis.degree.level | Masters | en_NZ |
thesis.degree.name | Master of Laws | en_NZ |