Relief from unconscionable transactions

Abstract

The unconscientious abuse of financial power has provided a perennial problem for the law. Since 1545, when Henry VIII repealed the laws prohibiting the taking of interest, courts and legislatures have, at various times, been concerned with the development of rules to regulate the trade in money and credit. Much of their effort has been directed to the relief of financial oppression. The purpose of this thesis la to study and evaluate the equitable doctrine authorizing the review of unconscionable transactions and its twentieth-century statutory equivalents. The results of this evaluation have been applied to a current New Zealand problem: the regulation of credit granting transactions. Working from the premise, for which there is some support, that credit devices require regulation, consideration is given to appropriate controls for the New Zealand industry. It is suggested that an unconscionability section, modified by the provision of statutory presumptions, might provide a flexible, effective and reasonably certain form of regulation.