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A Game Theory Approach to Research on Lobbying Activities in Accounting Regulation: Benefits and Issues

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dc.contributor.author Baskerville, Rachel F
dc.date.accessioned 2012-05-01T02:34:05Z
dc.date.accessioned 2022-07-05T02:32:24Z
dc.date.available 2012-05-01T02:34:05Z
dc.date.available 2022-07-05T02:32:24Z
dc.date.copyright 2007
dc.date.issued 2007
dc.identifier.uri https://ir.wgtn.ac.nz/handle/123456789/18646
dc.description.abstract There is a lack of consensus on the most appropriate methodological framework for studies of regulation and due process in order to provide robust outcomes and predictive potential. In addition to this diversity of approaches, research typically adopts a “single event focus” to an examination of due process and regulatory efficiency. The objective of this research is to examine the advantages and issues arising when methodologies offering a multi event approach are adopted; specifically the utility of game theory methodology in accounting lobbying research. The applications of game theory in previous studies in accounting research are summarised (the application to FASB voting rules, auditor client interaction, and accounting disclosure choices relevant to wage bargaining); and the theoretical basis for studies of lobbying behaviour is also reviewed. The standard model as currently utilised in research on lobbying activities is described; and an alternative dynamic model proposed. Four core issues arise in the application of such a dynamic model: identification of the master game and subgames; gradual or punctuated equilibrium; agency issues; and reputation effects. It is apparent from the application of game theory in other areas of accounting research, that evolutionary game theory offers a more comprehensive and dynamic model of real world events, based on multi period or sequential events. The proposed utility of a game theoretic model in accounting research on due process and regulation justifies further developments in this area. en_NZ
dc.format pdf en_NZ
dc.language.iso en_NZ
dc.publisher Te Herenga Waka—Victoria University of Wellington en_NZ
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working Paper en_NZ
dc.relation.ispartofseries No. 42 en_NZ
dc.relation.uri http://www.victoria.ac.nz/sacl/cagtr/working-papers/WP42.pdf
dc.subject game theory en_NZ
dc.subject evolutionary en_NZ
dc.subject accounting en_NZ
dc.title A Game Theory Approach to Research on Lobbying Activities in Accounting Regulation: Benefits and Issues en_NZ
dc.type Text en_NZ
vuwschema.contributor.unit Centre for Accounting, Governance and Taxation Research en_NZ
vuwschema.contributor.unit School of Accounting and Commercial Law en_NZ
vuwschema.subject.anzsrcfor 150199 Accounting, Auditing and Accountability not elsewhere classified en_NZ
vuwschema.type.vuw Working or Occasional Paper en_NZ
vuwschema.subject.anzsrcforV2 350199 Accounting, auditing and accountability not elsewhere classified en_NZ

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