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Optimal Tax Rules for Addictive Consumption

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dc.contributor.author Bossi, Luca
dc.contributor.author Calcott, Paul
dc.contributor.author Petkov, Vladimir
dc.date.accessioned 2011-06-23T01:54:56Z
dc.date.accessioned 2022-07-05T02:04:00Z
dc.date.available 2011-06-23T01:54:56Z
dc.date.available 2022-07-05T02:04:00Z
dc.date.copyright 2011
dc.date.issued 2011
dc.identifier.uri https://ir.wgtn.ac.nz/handle/123456789/18595
dc.description.abstract This paper studies implementation of the social optimum in a model of habit formation. We consider taxes that address inefficiencies due to negative consumption externalities, imperfect competition, and self-control problems. Our contributions are to: i) account for producers’ market power; and ii) require implementation to be robust and time consistent. Together, these features can imply significantly lower taxes. We provide a general characterization of the optimal tax rule and illustrate it with two examples. en_NZ
dc.format pdf en_NZ
dc.language.iso en_NZ
dc.publisher Te Herenga Waka—Victoria University of Wellington en_NZ
dc.relation.ispartofseries SEF Working Paper Series en_NZ
dc.subject dynamic externalities en_NZ
dc.subject internalities en_NZ
dc.subject addiction en_NZ
dc.subject optimal taxation en_NZ
dc.subject time consistent implementation en_NZ
dc.title Optimal Tax Rules for Addictive Consumption en_NZ
dc.type Text en_NZ
vuwschema.contributor.unit School of Economics and Finance en_NZ
vuwschema.subject.anzsrcfor 149999 Economics not elsewhere classified en_NZ
vuwschema.subject.marsden 140199 Economic Theory not elsewhere classified en_NZ
vuwschema.type.vuw Working or Occasional Paper en_NZ
vuwschema.subject.anzsrcforV2 389999 Other economics not elsewhere classified en_NZ
dc.rights.rightsholder www.vuw.ac.nz/sef en_NZ

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