Browsing by Author "Stevens, Donald Leslie"

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The crown, the Governor-General and the Constitution
(Te Herenga Waka—Victoria University of Wellington, 1974) Stevens, Donald Leslie
The status of New Zealand under the Crown has evolved from colony to dominion and now to independent kingdom. In the process the expansion of the capacity and powers of the New Zealand Executive has seen the development of dichotomised channels for the submission of advice to the Crown for the exercise of the Royal Prerogatives. The Governor-General has exercised the prerogatives delegated in the 1917 Letters Patent constituting his office - essentially the prerogative powers pertinent to the internal government of the country - while the submission of advice for the exercise of the non-delegated prerogatives - viz: the royal prerogative in the field of foreign affairs, the war prerogative, the honours prerogative, the power to issue seals and the power to regulate the Office of Governor-General - has gone from the Crown's New Zealand advisers to the Sovereign. Questions have arisen, however, as to the Governor-General's competence to exercise the non-delegated prerogatives on the Queen's behalf. This question is generally discussed in the context of the current constitutional status of New Zealand and the inappropriateness of the 1917 Letters Patent and the Royal Instructions of the same year. Both Instruments are in dire need of revision. The position of the Governor-General himself has also fundamentally altered. No longer the representative of, and appointed on the advice of the British Government, he remains as the resident head of the executive: the representative of the Queen in her capacity of Sovereign of New Zealand. As such he is appointed by the Queen on the advice of her New Zealand Ministers, on whose advice he may also be removed from office. The prospect of an insecure tenure is prejudicial to the position of the Crown and the Constitution, as it stands as threatening both the influence of the Crown in affairs of State and the power of the Crown to call forth the reserve powers (to dismiss ministers, refuse requests for dissolutions of Parliament and refuse the royal assent) in emergencies when the constitution is threatened by the action of ministers. A security of tenure for the Governor-General will in large measure reduce these dangers. It is likely that, notwithstanding his changed status, the law will continue to cast the Governor-General in the role of a special agent of the Crown who is not competent to exercise the full sovereign authority of the country. It may be regarded as unsatisfactory that some executive acts are not exercised by the Crown from within New Zealand and it might be that all royal powers in respect to New Zealand should be exercised within the Country. New Zealand's status can now be seen as justifying the appointment of a Representative of the Crown who enjoys full viceregal rank and who is to exercise the entire Sovereign authority during the Monarch's absence from New Zealand.
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The Licensing of Commercial Activity in New Zealand
(Te Herenga Waka—Victoria University of Wellington, 1986) Stevens, Donald Leslie
State intervention in market activity has been prevalent. It has included controls upon entry into spheres of commercial activity. Licensing has generally been the mechanism used in two situations, viz. to impose quantitative controls or qualitative controls that have conferred discretionary powers upon the licenser. This study of fourteen areas of licensed activity reveals that in those areas the necessity for licensing (or its continuation) has not always been adequately established. Pressure groups have been influential. Incentives to protect vested interests may, especially with quantitative licensing, have been high. The effectiveness of the controls is open to question. So is the appropriateness of adjudicative procedures, as opposed to market forces, as a regulatory agent. The social and economic cost of licensing has not been insignificant. Quantitative licensing has subjected aspiring participants in an activity to the exercise of wide discretionary power. In the quantitative area also, licensing tribunals have often been accorded a wide discretion, largely because of the use of imprecise statutory formulae. Moreover, quantitative restrictions on entry have in some cases created 'closed shops’ to which further entry has not been possible. In other industries new entrants have succeeded only after expending a good deal of energy, effort and expense. Success in gaining entry has often paid handsome financial dividends. Quantitative entry restrictions have not always ensured that the most able have participated in the controlled activity and may have encouraged complacency and inefficiency. There have also been other social and economic costs. Avoidance and evasion have been features of both quantitative and qualitative licensing demonstrating, perhaps, that law makers have been inclined to over-estimate the effectiveness of the law. Calls for consolidation or extension of control have sometimes been generated as a result. The alternatives to licensing have seldom been adequately considered, if they have been considered at all. Such alternatives might have been equally, if not more, effective and less onerous.