Browsing by Author "Stallmann, Finn"

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Open Access
The case against electing district health boards
(Te Herenga Waka—Victoria University of Wellington, 2016) Stallmann, Finn
In this paper, I argue that elections to District Health Boards (DHBs) should be abolished. This argument comprises the first half of the paper. My argument has two broad steps. The first focuses on the elections themselves. It shows that most voters are uninterested in and uninformed about DHB elections. The second step focuses on the powers and limitations of DHBs. It shows that DHBs’ primary function is to implement health policy set by central government, not to implement the wishes of or represent their electors. The combined force of these steps provides a sufficient reason to abolish DHB elections. In short, the lack of public interest and the degree of ministerial oversight means there is no real scope for democracy. Accountability mechanisms should focus on the responsible Minister. The second half of the paper determines what the alternative should be. It canvasses a number of possibilities. I conclude that the best alternative is that DHB Boards should be entirely appointed and that their consultation function should be carried out by a committee of a local authority.
Open Access
In defence of direct democracy: The case for binding citizens initiated referenda in New Zealand
(Te Herenga Waka—Victoria University of Wellington, 2015) Stallmann, Finn
I argue that citizens initiated referenda (CIR) should be legally binding. While referenda are an established part of New Zealand’s constitutional framework, ordinary citizens only have the power to initiate nonbinding CIR. A system of binding CIR (BCIR) would be an improvement. Firstly, BCIR would give greater respect to individual citizens’ rationality, freedom and equality. Secondly, BCIR would make New Zealand more democratic. Thirdly, BCIR would have a number of instrumental benefits. Various arguments can be advanced in defence of the current representative democratic paradigm. They include common arguments such as those regarding voter incompetence, tyranny of the majority, and incompatibility with current governing arrangements. They are all flawed. In short, the people can be trusted to govern themselves. I finish my argument by providing an example of how the process of direct democratic lawmaking might work in New Zealand. It differs significantly from the current CIR process, but I do not mean to set it in stone. I use it to show how proper institutional design can refute some counterarguments. The final form will be decided upon by the people and their representatives.