Browsing by Author "Iseki, Atsushi"

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Dignaga's Theory of Perception: Between Ordinary and Extra-Ordinary
(Te Herenga Waka—Victoria University of Wellington, 2006) Iseki, Atsushi; Shaw, Jay
This thesis is about the theory of perception propounded by Dignaga, a Buddhist thinker in India, in the medieval era (circa A.D. 480-5401). He defines perception as "cognition free from conceptual construction." To figure out how this statement should be understood is our main task. My main thesis is this: In Dignaga's theory, perception is primarily the concept-free state of mind obtained by some effort, quite likely a meditative one, based on an idealistic view of reality.
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Removing Problematics: A Distinct Element in Dharmakīrti’s Theories of Inference
(Te Herenga Waka—Victoria University of Wellington, 2014) Iseki, Atsushi; Radich, Michael; Osto, Douglas
Dharmakīrti is one of the most influential figures in Buddhist epistemological and argumentative tradition. In the past century or so, there has been remarkable progress in the study of Dharmakīrti and his school of Buddhism. However, despite the progress, there are some claims concerning his theories of inferential knowledge that seem peculiar or do not appear to make good sense. The problem of those claims has not been dealt with in a satisfactory manner by scholars. Thus, in this work, I have identified and carefully examined some of those puzzling claims that were most significant and relevant to my interest. In Part I of my thesis, I deal with issues about the format of presentation. That format is similar to the traditional syllogism. However, it does not have the thesis (conclusion), while having an example. The co-presence of these two features gives the impression of inconsistency. I will examine these two peculiar features and argue that both function to preclude unwarranted assertions or other problematic cases of inference. In Part II, I will investigate Dharmakīrti’s method of establishing the inference based on self-nature, namely, sattvānumāna (the inference based on existence) for establishing the momentariness of everything real and the generalization of its core structure, viz., bādhakapramāṇa (the elimination as a means of knowledge). I will argue that, despite its strength and virtues, most of the content of sattvānumāna can be expressed by positive assertions as well, and thus, to capture the significance of sattvānumāna fully, we should take some pragmatic function of eliminative reasoning into account, such as removing doubt. I also show that in Dharmakīrti’s context the idea of bādhakapramāṇa-based inference should be taken as an ideal that especially worked well in sattvānumāna. As a result of my findings in Parts I and II, I conclude that there is a clear tendency in Dharmakīrti’s attitude, which is to emphasize the importance of removing problematic possibilities in knowledge-acquiring activities. His emphasis on this principle of “removing problematics” appears in different forms in his discourse according to the context, and to know about this tendency is highly significant and beneficial in understanding the nature of Dharmakīrti’s system. Thus, this work captures often subtle but key characteritics of Dharmakīrti’s theories and assumptions, which might have been overlooked from the mainline understanding of his thought to date.