Browsing by Author "Contreras, Javier"

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Electricity Market Games with Constraints on Transmission Capacity and Emissions
(Te Herenga Waka—Victoria University of Wellington, 2007) Zuccollo, James; Contreras, Javier; Krawczyk, Jacek B
Consider an electricity market populated by competitive agents using thermal generating units. Such generation involves the emission of pollutants, on which a regulator might impose constraints. Transmission capacities for sending energy may naturally be restricted by the grid facilities. Both pollution standards and transmission capacities can impose several constraints upon the joint strategy space of the agents. We propose a coupled constraints equilibrium as a solution to the regulator's problem of avoiding both congestion and excessive pollution. Using the coupled constraints Lagrange multipliers as taxation coefficients the regulator can compel the agents to obey the multiple constraints. However, for this modification of the players' payoffs to induce the required behaviour a coupled constraints equilibrium needs to exist and be unique. A three-node bilateral market example with a DC model of the transmission line constraints described in possesses these properties and will be used in this paper to discuss and explain the behaviour agents subjected to coupled constraints.
Open Access
The Invisible Polluter: Can Regulators Save Consumer Surplus?
(Te Herenga Waka—Victoria University of Wellington, 2008) Krawczyk, Jacek B; Zuccollo, James; Contreras, Javier
Consider an electricity market populated by competitive agents using thermal generating units. Such generation involves the emission of pollutants, on which a regulator might impose constraints. Transmission capacities for sending energy may naturally be restricted by the grid facilities. Both pollution standards and transmission capacities can impose several constraints upon the joint strategy space of the agents. We propose a coupled constraints equilibrium as a solution to the regulator's problem of avoiding both congestion and excessive pollution. Using the coupled constraints' Lagrange multipliers as taxation coefficients the regulator can compel the agents to obey the multiple constraints. However, for this modification of the players' payoffs to induce the required behaviour a coupled constraints equilibrium needs to exist and must also be unique. A three-node market example with a dc model of the transmission line constraints described in [8] and [2] possesses these properties. We extend it here to utilise a two-period load duration curve and, in result, obtain a two-period game. The implications of the game solutions obtained for several weights, which the regulator can use to vary the level of generators' responsibilities for the constraints' satisfaction, for consumer and producer surpluses will be discussed.
Open Access
A Scheme For Incentivizing Investment in Transmission Enhancements
(Te Herenga Waka—Victoria University of Wellington, 2007) Contreras, Javier
Providing the right incentives for investment continues to be a major source of concern in the New Zealand electricity sector. This seminar outlines a decentralised incentive mechanism designed to encourage transmission investment within a competitive market environment based on a system that rewards investors according to the additional social welfare they create. This mechanism is then compared with a centralised system in which all decisions are made by a single transmission planner.To read the paper this presentation is based on click here.
Open Access
A Scheme For Incentivizing Investment in Transmission Enhancements
(Te Herenga Waka—Victoria University of Wellington, 2007) Contreras, Javier; Gross, George; Ruiz-Gomez, Isabel
We present an incentive scheme to stimulate investment in the improvement/ expansion of the transmission network in the competitive market environment. The formulation of these incentives is based on a decentralized transmission asset investment model and is derived from the value added to the social welfare by an asset investment. In the formulation we view each potential investor as a player in a cooperative game and we use the unique solution provided by the Shapley value to allocate the payment to each successful investor commensurated with the increase in social welfare the investment brings to the system. The formulation brings valuable insights on the transmission investment topic. We apply the proposed methodology to the Garver 6-bus system to illustrate the capabilites and flexibility of the scheme and to gain insights into the development of network improvements through the formulation proposed.